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-Introduction
In 1985 and 1986 the United States Department of Justice filed
thirteen suits against motion picture theater owners across the coun-
try, charging them with collusive price fixing and market allocation in
the licensing of films from motion picture distributors.' Instead of
bidding against one another for each new movie, groups of exhibitors
in various cities allegedly prearranged to "split" the right to bid for
forthcoming movies among themselves.2 Consequently, distributors
found only one exhibitor negotiating for their films in each market
area.' Split agreements appear to be a rather blatant form of collu-
sion. In their defense, exhibitors argued that film splitting provides
efficiency gains, which lower the costs of movie distribution and in-
crease competition, both between exhibitors and between motion pic-
tures. Facing criminal charges, film splitting exhibitors in the midst of
litigation are an admittedly biased group, but could there be merit to
their claims?
Despite the widespread use of film splitting for over thirty years,
it has long been a puzzling practice and the subject of much antitrust
litigation. Distributors, the parties most directly harmed by such a
collusive monopsony, have rarely challenged film splitting. Film split-
ting flourished for years with both distributor and United States gov-
ernment approval.4 Distributors' long acceptance of film splitting,
when they could have curtailed the practice by lawsuits and other
means, suggests that splitting agreements offered efficiency gains to
distributors which outweighed their potential anticompetitive costs.
1. [1980-1988 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) IT 45,085-45,086. A number
of private suits on film splitting, arguing that rivals were foreclosed from competition and
boycotted by distributors, have also been tried. See, e.g., The Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists
Communications, Inc., 909 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1990); Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Art-
ists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989); Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. Gen-
eral Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1988); 3 Penny Theater Corp. v. Plitt Theatres,
Inc., 812 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1987); Exhibitors' Serv. Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc.,
788 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1986). A parallel investigation of alleged first-run movie exhibition
monopolization in select cities was conducted by the Justice Department, resulting in a suit
on exhibitor monopolization in Las Vegas, Nevada. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903
F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990).
2. See General Cinema v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1266 (C.D.
Cal. 1982).
3. James S. Gordon, Horizontal and Vertical Restraints of Trade: The Legality of Mo-
tion Picture Splits Under the Antitrust Laws, 75 YALE L.J. 239, 240 (1965).
4. The first industry-wide challenge by distributors to split agreements did not occur
until the early 1980s. See, e.g., General Cinema, 532 F. Supp. at 1244. Even this action took
place in the form of a countersuit by Buena Vista against General Cinema. Id.
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What these gains were, however, remained a puzzle to most
commentators.5
Distribution practices, for which business reasons are unclear at
times, such as tie-in sales, resale price maintenance, and product bun-
dling, have often been viewed as anticompetitive, foreclosing markets
to rivals and extending monopoly power. This Article investigates
whether film splitting is a naked price conspiracy or a means to im-
prove economic efficiency. Should it be judged a per se offense, as the
government and others hold, so plainly anticompetitive that no elabo-
rate study is necessary, or are there sufficient potential efficiencies
generated by splitting to warrant its investigation under a rule of rea-
son?6 In short, this Article attempts to explain why both exhibitors
and distributors long favored the use of film splitting. Section I de-
scribes the main forms of license agreements in film distribution. Sec-
tion II provides a brief history of the legal status of split agreements.
Section III summarizes the leading case on split agreements, United
States v. Capitol Service.7 Section IV surveys past explanations of split
agreements. Section V describes motion picture distribution practices
before the landmark Paramount decision.8 Section VI analyzes post-
Paramount distribution practices and the purposes of splitting. Sec-
tion. VII assesses current legal standards in splitting cases as the basis
for a rule of reason analysis.
Methods of Film Licensing
Motion picture licenses are granted in four ways: competitive
bidding; competitive negotiations; noncompetitive negotiations; and
film splitting.9 In competitive bidding, distributors send out bid letters
5. William J. Borner, Motion Picture Split Agreements: An Antitrust Analysis, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 159 (1983); Ralph Cassady, Jr., Impact of the Paramount Decision on
Motion Picture Distribution and Price Making, 31 S. CAL. L. REV. 150, 164-65 (1957-58);
Gordon, supra note 3; Roy W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Book-
ing, 26 J.L. & ECON. 497, 520-22 (1983); Comment, An Experiment in Preventive Anti-trust:
Judicial Regulation of the Motion Picture Exhibition Market Under the Paramount Decrees,
74 YALE L.J. 1040, 1109 (1965).
6. Rule of reason investigations of price fixing agreements are uncommon but not
without precedent. Efficiency gains from price fixing agreements have, in some cases, been
sufficient to make them legal. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468
U.S. 85, 100-02 (1984); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1979).
7. United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 756 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Capi-
tol Serv. II].
8. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U.S. 131 (1948).
9. See United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 134, 136-38 (E:D. Wis. 1983)
[hereinafter Capitol Serv. 1]; Nat D. Feliman, The Exhibitor, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS
BOOK 313, 315-22 (Jason E. Squire ed., 1983); Cassady, supra note 5, at 160-77.
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for a specific movie, announcing minimum terms.10 Terms may in-
clude nonrefundable rental guarantees offered for the rights to a
film," an advance payment against subsequent box office receipts,' 2
sharing box office receipts on some percentage terms,' 3 cooperative
advertising percentages,' 4 provisions for geographic exclusivity rela-
tive to other showings of the same movie (known as clearances),' 5
length of movie run,' 6 and opening date.' 7 For peak season showings,
during Easter, the summer months, and Christmas, competitive bids
are generally solicited six months or more in advance.' 8 All bids can
be rejected if found inadequate, with either a new request for bids' 9 or
competitive negotiations.2' In competitive negotiations, a distributor
negotiates with two or more exhibitors competing for the right to li-
cense a movie, rather than opening bidding to all theaters in a given
market area.2 '
In noncompetitive negotiations a distributor negotiates with only
one exhibitor.22 This takes place by necessity in one-theater-owner or
"closed" towns. In some cases, a single owner may control all or al-
most all first-run screens in a city. Another form of noncompetitive
negotiation, known as "tracking," occurs when a distributor deals with
the same exhibitor in a city on a non-explicitly contractual but long-
term basis, similar to an exclusive dealing arrangement. 23 This infor-
mal exclusive dealing arrangement is sometimes known as a
''marriage."
Finally, under split agreements, exhibitors organize to allocate
forthcoming movies among themselves;2 4 exhibitors decide with
whom a distributor will negotiate initially for a given film. Distribu-
tors typically send bid letters to first-run exhibitors, but only the split
agreement's designated exhibitor negotiates with the distributor.
Other exhibitors agree not to compete with a designated exhibitor.
Frequently, a distributor would make a phone call to find out which
10. Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. at 137.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Fellman, supra note 9, at 319-20.
15. Capitol Serv. 1, 568 F. Supp. at 139.
16. Id. at 137.
17. Id.
18. See Fellman, supra note 9, at 318.
19. Fellman, supra note 9, at 316; Cassady, supra note 5, at 162.
20. Cassady, supra note 5, at 162.
21. Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. at 138.
22. Id.
23. Cassady, supra note 5, at 164-65.
24. Capitol Serv. 1, 568 F. Supp. at 138.
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exhibitor had been assigned its movie. If an agreement cannot be
reached on a particular movie, the distributor may negotiate with a
second, designated exhibitor or an exhibitor who remains outside the
split-agreement.25 In a sense, a split-agreement involves noncompeti-
tive negotiations, although alternative exhibitors are available. The
process differs from tracking since multiple exhibitors take turns ne-
gotiating for movies.26
A further important aspect of .motion picture distribution in-
volves financial settling-up between exhibitor and distributor. Since
exhibitors' expectations of film revenues are often not fulfilled, post-
screening "adjustments" have long characterized movie distribution.27
Adjustments change the terms of the initial license agreement, such as
length of run, geographic clearances, percentage rental terms, and ad-
vertising sharing. For example, rather than have a theater play to a
relatively empty house, negotiations can shorten the licensed run
without penalty to the theater or allow a "move over," which moves
the film to a smaller theater. In other cases exhibitors are reimbursed
directly for lost revenues.2 8 Since distributors and exhibitors must
work together on a long-term cooperative basis, it behooves the dis-
tributor not to impose prohibitive losses on exhibitors. Adjustments
have been part of the motion picture distribution process since at least
the 1930s.29
Adjustments are not used in competitive bidding. 30 Guarantees
by exhibitors are not refundable nor are license terms adjusted if a
film does poorly. Adjustments would distort the bidding process,
leading to grossly inflated bids, since winning exhibitors would expect
adjustments to compensate for inflated bids. Adjustments after com-
petitive bidding would also leave distributors vulnerable to price dis-
crimination lawsuits by non-winning bidders. 31
25. Id. at 145-46.
26. Tracking was considered a form of splitting in the 1950s, when exhibitors were
commonly tracking with one or more distributors. See Cassady, supra note 5, at 164. Split-
ting as generally used here refers to a rotation of exhibitors film-by-film, regardless of film
distributor. Tracking refers to quasi-long-term, voluntary, noncontractual exclusive dealing
arrangements. Capitol Serv. 1, 568 F. Supp. at 138.
27. MICHAEL CONANT, ANTITRUST IN THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY 75 (Arno
Press 1978) (1960); Fellman, supra note 9, at 321.
28. CONANT, supra note 27, at 75, 135.
29. In some cases, adjustment forms were used by exhibitors to request license revi-
sions. Id.
30. Fellman, supra note 9, at 321.
31. Gordon, supra note 3, at 240.
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The Legal History of Film Splitting
Splitting and tracking dominated film licensing agreements fol-
lowing the Paramount decision. 2 The Justice Department did not
challenge split agreements for thirty years and periodically issued
statements before congressional committees and in communications
with the movie industry approving their use.33 The government's ac-
ceptance of split agreements likely stemmed from an attempt to fol-
low the precedent laid down in the Paramount decision. In
Paramount the Supreme Court reversed the district court's call for
mandatory competitive bidding on all films, holding that competitive
bidding favored exhibitors with the "longest purse. '34  By allowing
split agreements, the government may have believed it was ensuring a
more equitable division of films and thus preserving small exhibitors.
Numerous private actions were brought against split agree-
ments.35 In many cases exhibitors who were not members of a split
agreement claimed they were illegally denied films by distributors and
splitting exhibitors.36 In most instances the courts found little evi-
dence of an illegal boycott. 7 Prior to 1977, the courts judged splitting
agreements under a rule of reason analysis.38 If distributors consented
to a split agreement, it was legal.39 If distributors did not consent to a
split agreement they could recover damages from exhibitors.40 Thus,
32. Cassady, supra note 5, at 161.
33. 'Motion Picture Distribution Trade Practices: Hearings Before Select Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 651-52 (1953)
(testimony of Stanley N. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice)
[hereinafter 1953 Hearings]; Motion Picture Splits-Dept. of Justice Opposition, [1969-1983
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,313 [hereinafter Justice Dept.].
34. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U.S. 131, 164 (1948).
35. Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 313 (6th Cir.
1989); Harkins Amusement Enters., Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 850 F.2d 477, 480 (9th
Cir. 1988); 3 Penny Theater Corp. v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 812 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1987);
Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1982); Wilder En-
ters., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980); Viking Theatre
Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320 F.2d 285, 287 (3d Cir. 1963); Admiral Theatre
Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977).
36. Southway, 672 F.2d at 485; Wilder, 632 F.2d at 1135; Dahl, Inc. v. Ray Cooper Co.,
448 F.2d 17 (9th Cir. 1971); Viking, 320 F.2d at 287; Admiral, 437 F. Supp. at 1268.
37. Harkins, 850 F.2d at 480; Dahl, 448 F.2d at 17; Viking, 320 F.2d at 287; Admiral,
437 F. Supp. at 1268.
38. See, e.g., Dahl, 448 F.2d at 19; United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1962 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 70,347.
39. Id.
40. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964), affg
in part and rev'g in part, Samuel Goldwyn Prods. v. Fox W. Coast Theatres Corp., 194 F.
Supp. 507 (N.D. Cal. 1961).
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precedent existed for distributors to block the use of split agreements.
The courts' position made economic sense. If distributors, those po-
tentially most harmed by splits, did not object when they had full
knowledge of a split's existence and could have stopped it by various
means, then why should the courts intervene? Of course, there was
strong dissent from commentators, who viewed splits as naked price
fixing agreements and market allocations.41 However, the law also
held, somewhat belatedly, that if distributors participated in splits to
boycott non-split member exhibitors, then splits were illegal.42
On April 1, 1977, the Justice Department reversed its almost
thirty-year stand, announcing that split agreements were virtually in-
distinguishable from bid-rigging and thus per se illegal. 3 Exhibitors
were warned that continued use of split agreements would result in
prosecution. Several exhibitors brought suit asking for a declaratory
judgment as to whether split agreements were illegal per se." The
court found that the splits were not illegal per se and were to be
judged under the rule of reason.45 The Justice Department did not
appeal. Subsequent lower court opinions were divided on the per se
status of split agreements.46
Meanwhile, the Justice Department, tiring of a lack of voluntary
compliance with its 1977 announcement, brought a civil action against
a split agreement in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on both rule of reason and
per se grounds.47 Both the district and appellate courts found in favor
of the government, ruling that splits were per se illegal.41 Once Capi-
tol Service was upheld on appeal, the Justice Department filed numer-
ous suits against film splitting. From January 1985 through January
1987, the Justice Department filed fourteen suits across the United
States, covering both large cities (e.g., Denver, Dallas, and Los Ange-
les) and small cities (e.g., Quincy, Illinois; Greenville, South Carolina;
41. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 240.
42. Wilder Enters., Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980).
43. Justice Dept., supra note 33, 50,313.
44. Greenbrier Cinemas, Inc. v. Attorney General of the United States, 511 F. Supp.
1046, 1048 (W.D. Va. 1981).
45. Id.
46. General Cinema Corp v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1256, 1279
(C.D. Cal. 1982) (holding all splits as per se violations of the Sherman Act); contra Bal-
moral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 314 (6th Cir. 1989) (hold-
ing lawfulness of split agreement was properly resolved under rule of reason analysis);
Exhibitors' Serv., Inc. v. American Multi-Cinema, Inc., 788 F.2d 574 (9th Cir. 1986). For a
history of actions on film splitting, see United States v. Kerasotes-Illinois Theatres, 650 F.
Supp. 963, 964-66 (C.D. III. 1987).
47. Capitol Serv. 1, 568 F. Supp. 134, 134 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
48. Id.; Capitol Serv. 11, 756 F.2d 502, 502 (7th Cir. 1985).
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and Deptford, New Jersey). 9 In eight cases exhibitors signed consent
decrees, paying fines ranging from $75,000 to $750,000.50 In at least
two cases, exhibitors chose to contest the government's claims.5
IH
United States v. Capitol Service, Inc.
The leading case on film splitting is Capitol Service. 2 The facts
are fairly typical of film splitting cases and will aid in understanding
why splitting is currently regarded as anticompetitive. Four exhibitor
chains in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, accounting for thirty-three of thirty-
seven first-run screens, met on November 30, 1977 to form a film-split
agreement.53 Under the agreement, exhibitors took turns negotiating
for films, with each having a geographic clearance 4.5  The government
argued that the split included the following agreements: (1) not to bid
on films; (2) not to negotiate for a film until it was split; and (3) not to
compete for a film against a split-member.5 According to the exhibi-
tors, the agreement simply allocated the "right of first negotiation" for
a movie. 6 If negotiations broke down, a distributor could always turn
to another exhibitor.5
From 1975 to the start of the split agreement in 1977, films in
Milwaukee had been licensed by competitive bidding, competitive ne-
gotiations, or tracking. 5  Anticipated high-grossing films were li-
censed by competitive bidding. 9 Other films were licensed by
competitive negotiations or, in some cases, by tracking.6" Exhibitors
described the pre-1975 licensing method as tracking; the court de-
scribed it as a distributor-by-distributor split agreement. 61 In fact,
even after splitting was instituted, United Artists continued tracking
with two of the defendants.62
49. [1980-1988 Transfer Binder] Tade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,085-45,087.
50. Id.
51. United States v. Kerasotes-Illinois Theatres, 650 F. Supp. 963, 963 (C.D. I11. 1987);
United States v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 1987 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 45,086, at 53,789.
52. Capitol Serv. II, 756 F.2d 502; Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. 134.
53. Capitol Serv. 1, 568 F. Supp. at 138-40.
54. Id. at 141.
55. Id. at 143.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 139.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 146.
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Testimony established that a major purpose in adopting splitting
was to eliminate competitive bidding. Exhibitors believed that com-
petitive bidding led to excessive guarantees, rental percentages in
favor of distributors, and extended playtimes well beyond minimum
license terms.63 This testimony proved determinative in the court's
decision.64
The court also relied on empirical evidence to conclude that the
split was anticompetitive. First, the number of competitive bids for
films dropped sharply after 1977, from seventy-four in 1977 to four in
1978 and to one in 1980.65 Second, guarantee payments dropped from
$1.8 million in 1977 to $140,000 in 1980.6 Third, the number of ad-
justments in rental terms favoring exhibitors increased after 1977.67
Fourth, playtimes shortened after 1977.1
The evidence was interpreted as showing the monopsony power
inherent in split agreements.69 The court's arguments, however, are
questionable. The court's view that increased adjustments are neces-
sarily an indication of monopsony leverage is incorrect. Since adjust-
ments do not take place under competitive bidding, they would
naturally increase in the absence of bidding. If monopsony rents exist,
how they are divided between rental terms and adjustments is of no
substantial consequence since the full amount can, in principle, be ex-
tracted in either rental terms or adjustments. Increased adjustments
do not indicate an extension of monopsony power but only a different
division in revenues between rental terms and adjustments. In addi-
tion, adjustments are used outside of splits, such as in tracking, and
thus are not inherently anticompetitive.
The court's view that shortened runs are an indicator of monop-
sony power is also questionable. Both exhibitors and distributors are
interested in maximizing revenue at the box office for a given admis-
sion price. Exhibitors are interested in maximizing tickets sold since
concession goods sales accrue exclusively to exhibitors and offer much
63. Id. at 139-40.
64. Distributors knew of the agreement from its inception yet did nothing to stop its
use. Id. at 145. Distributors testified that they were opposed to the split agreement and
they also filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the government. Id. at 136. Given that
they could have taken private action long before, their protests were more than a little
disingenuous.
65. Id. at 144.
66. Id. at 146.
67. Id. at 147.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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higher profit margins than box office receipts. 70 Because admission
prices are generally constant across first-run theaters in a city, maxi-
mizing box office revenues and tickets sold are equivalent. Thus ex-
hibitors would not want to end film runs prematurely anymore than
would distributors. If runs were shorter under the split agreement,
and if this were not due to other causes, such as changes in the quality
of films or increased nonfilm competition, then movie runs under
competitive bidding were nonoptimal. By providing playtimes for
more movies, and thus a greater selection and variety of movies, split-
ting appears to have improved competition in at least one dimension.
The defendants introduced evidence that splitting had no adverse
affect on the share of total rentals accruing to distributors.71 Distribu-
tor film rental revenues include guarantees, advances against box of-
fice, box office share, share of advertising paid by exhibitors, :and any
adjustments made post-screening.72 A study showing that distributor
film rental revenues in Milwaukee, Minneapolis-St. Paul and many
eastern cities were no different between split and non-split cities was
rejected by the court.73 The court found that many factors which de-
termine film rentals were not adequately accounted for in the defend-
ants' study.74 Defendants also offered procompetitive rationales for
split agreements, such as improved licensing efficiency and increased
competition between movies, between exhibitors, and between dis-
tributors.75 The court found these arguments factually doubtful and
immaterial because the court was not required to distinguish between
good and poor forms of competition under the Sherman Act.76 The
court found the split-agreement was per se illegal and illegal under the
rule of reason because the alleged procompetitive benefits were
deemed not material.77
70. HAROLD L. VOGEL, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY ECONoMics 78 (1986); Peter J.
Dekom, The Motion Picture in 1987: A Study in Economic Turmoil, 237 Patent, Copy-
rights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook 147 (Mar. 25, 1987).
71. Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. at 134.
72. Id. at 136-38.
73. Id. at 148.
74. Id. In General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., Buena Vista submitted a
study comparing license terms under competitive bidding and splitting in comparable thea-
ters and locations. 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1263 (C.D. Cal. 1982). The study found that bidding
increased percentage rental terms to distributors, increased the likelihood of guarantees,
and resulted in a larger number of extended runs. Id. For further evidence, see discussion
infra part VII.A.
75. Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. at 153.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 154.
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IV
Alternative Explanations of Split Agreements
A. Collusion
According to the Justice Department, exhibitor price collusion
explains split agreements.78 There are good reasons to be suspicious
of this explanation. First, the retail or exhibitor level of the movie
industry does not generally possess characteristics conducive to viable
collusive agreements. In most cities there are no significant barriers
to entry, demand is not strongly inelastic because of substitute forms
of entertainment and movie viewing, costs differ across chains and be-
tween chains and independents, films and theaters are not homogene-
ous, and the demand for movies is not stable over time. In addition,
exhibitors have no means of forcing rivals into a split agreement or
preventing members from dropping out and competing against the
splitting firms.79 Any member facing a-string of poor movies, owing to
bad luck of the draw under a split agreement, can bid against the split,
leading to a breakdown of the agreement.
Second, exhibitor collusion is at odds with much movie industry
analysis. The predominant view is that distributors have substantial
monopoly power which they have wielded for decades to block entry
into distribution, restrict the output of movies, and raise distributors'
rental shares.8' Whatever the merit of this view today, there is little
chance that exhibitors could successfully collude against distributors
via splitting agreements. Distributors are well aware of the operation
of split agreements. They can easily halt any exhibitor conspiracy by
refusing to deal, bringing antitrust suits against exhibitors, or report-
ing the exhibitors to the Justice Department. In addition, throughout
the 1950s, when the incidence of splitting was probably at its peak,8 '
there was tremendous excess capacity in theaters owing to the rapid
78. See, e.g., id. at 152 (DOJ's press release Apr. 1, 1977) (claiming that all splits are
per se illegal).
79. See, e.g., id. at 139 (distributor-by-distributor split among exhibitors broke down
when Capitol Service licensed the film "Lucky Lady" outside the terms of the split
agreement).
80. See generally CONANT, supra note 27; GARY R. EDGERTON, AMERICAN FILM Ex-
HIBITION AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY'S MARKET STRUCTURE,
1963-1980 (1983); MAE D. HUETrIG, ECONOMIC CONTROL OF THE MOTION PICTURE IN-
DUSTRY (1944); Michael Conant, The Paramount Decrees Reconsidered, in THE AMERICAN
FILM INDUSTRY 537-573 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985); Thomas Guback, Theatrical Film,
in WHO OWNS THE MEDIA? CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE MASS COMMUNICA-
TIONS INDUSTRY 179-249 (Benjamin M. Compaine ed., 2d ed. 1979); Robert W. Crandall,
Postwar Performance of the Motion Picture Industry, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 49 (1975).
81. Cassady, supra note 5, at 161.
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penetration of television, giving exhibitors little bargaining power
over distributors. 2
It is important to note that distributors had years of experience
dealing with monopoly exhibitors. In the 1930s there were hundreds
of one-theater towns.83 Prior to Paramount, distributors often owned
a partial interest in theaters in one-theater towns or dealt with pooling
agreements among independent theater owners.84 In the 1980s there
were even moderate sized cities, such as Las Vegas, Nevada, where
one firm was alleged to control all first-run movie theaters.85 Ignoring
for the moment potential entry into high concentration markets, dis-
tributors are not without recourse when bargaining with monopsony
buyers. Lost distributor revenues from refusals to deal in such situa-
tions represent a tiny fraction of a distributor's worldwide sales. But
for a local or regional theater owner, with many screens to fill and a
fickle public demanding constant variety in movies, lost revenues by a
distributor's refusal to deal can amount to a substantial portion of to-
tal firm sales, placing the exhibitor in greater financial risk.86 Similar
distributor leverage, along with threatened or actual lawsuits, could be
utilized if splitting resulted in monopsony rental terms. It is difficult
to imagine distributors at the mercy of an exhibitor splitting cartel.
Distributors have rarely attempted to stop split agreements by
legal action. They participated actively in splits with the full knowl-
81edge of such agreements for years. It was not until General Cinema,
some thirty years after Paramount, and after hundreds of thousands of
licenses had been signed under split agreements that distributors first
joined to support a challenge to split agreements.88
82. Theater capacity fell from 11.7 million seats in 1948 to 7.0 million seats in 1958.
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE TRADES-SUM-
MARY STATISTICS (1948 & 1958).
83. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 101 (1947) (defendant corporations owned
theaters in three states, 62% of which faced no competition within each respective city in
1939).
84. Arthur De Vany & Ross D. Eckert, Motion Picture Antitrust: The Paramount
Cases Revisited, 14 RES. IN L. & ECON. 51, 85-86 (1991).
85. United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d 659, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1990).
86. See, e.g., id. at 662 (because more than 300 films are released every year, successful
theater owners must run multiplex theaters with up to 18 screens so movie-goers may
choose from a wide variety of films).
87. See, e.g., General Cinema Corp. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244,
1248 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (long-established distributor sues exhibitor for participation in splits
in violation of the Sherman Act only after exhibitor sued the distributor in a different
matter).
88. An amicus curiae brief filed by eight distributors stated,
the Distributors are adamantly opposed to, and have not, do not and will not
participate or acquiesce in any exhibitor split arrangement. The Distributors re-
gard any and all exhibitor splits as horizontal, anticompetitive agreements among
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Despite the trappings of harmful collusion in split agreements,
true exhibitor welfare-reducing collusion remains doubtful. Conse-
quently, efficiency reasons for split agreements have long been sought.
B. Efficiency Explanations
Defendants in recent film splitting cases have offered a number of
explanations for splitting, few of which have convinced the courts. As
noted above, the defendants in Capitol Service held that film splitting
is more efficient than competitive bidding.89 Among the claimed ben-
efits from splitting were: 1) theaters obtain better movies for longer
runs, providing greater consumer satisfaction and higher levels of at-
tendance; and 2) nonmajor distributors obtain access to first-run thea-
ters under splitting, increasing competition between distributors.'
General Cinema claimed a more extensive list of procompetitive
benefits. 91 Six justifications for splits were offered: 1) Splits provide
greater lead time for advertising; 2) Splits provide greater flexibility in
scheduling runs by allowing adjustments in license terms after a pic
ture opens; 3) Splits reduce paperwork, time, and effort; 4) Splits re-
duce the risk of an empty screen or a distributor being without an
exhibition outlet; 5) Splits assure outlets and playtimes of a distribu-
tor's choice; and 6) Splits provide competitive protection for small in-
dependent theaters, keeping them in business.92
The court found these benefits provided convenience or financial
gains to General Cinema but did not enhance competition.93 As a
factual matter, the lead time for advertising justification was doubtful
since lead times are long under bidding, which generally takes place
about six months before a movie's release. 94 The competitive protec-
tion for small theaters justification was inapplicable since antitrust is
directed toward protecting competition, not less efficient competi-
tors.95 No evidence was introduced to indicate that paperwork en-
tailed substantial costs, and the issue of protection against empty
screens was dismissed on the grounds that all competition entails risks
competitors aimed at the Distributors, which are competitively indistinguishable
from price fixing, bid rigging, and customer allocation schemes. The injury suf-
fered by the Distributors as a consequence of splits is direct and substantial.
Id. at 1269-70 n.12. Given that distributors actively condoned and participated in splits for
30 years, nothing could be further from the truth.
89. Capitol Serv. I, 568 F. Supp. 134, 153 (E.D. Wis. 1983).
90. Id.
91. General Cinema, 532 F. Supp. at 1266.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1270-74.
94. Id. at 1271.
95. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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and antitrust enforcement is not intended to reduce risks.96 Assuring
distributors of their choice of outlets carried little weight since distrib-
utors are free to choose outlets and playtimes of their preference
under competitive bidding.97
The schedule flexibility and risk reduction justifications remain as
arguable issues. The court found that mere flexibility in scheduling
did not increase. competition. 9 This interpretation is questionable.
Split agreements allow mistakes in license terms, such as run lengths,
to be corrected, whereas competitive bidding locks exhibitors into
fixed run lengths. If box office receipts fall below expectations, split
agreements allow run lengths to be shortened, freeing screens for new
and potentially more profitable movies. This flexibility increases
product variety and the number of movies shown, benefiting
consumers.
The court was also hasty in dismissing lower risk under splitting
as not competition enhancing. For example, while all commerce en-
tails risk and accompanying costs, competition drives costs to mini-
mum efficient levels of operation. Lower risks reduce costs, and cost
reduction comprises a large part of the gains from competition. Cost
reducing practices that earn a competitive rate of return are clearly
competition enhancing. Hence, to the extent that splitting reduces
risk by insuring films for exhibitors and screens for distributors, it low-
ers the cost of distribution, thereby increasing consumer welfare.
C. Other Explanations
Based on an informal survey of lawyers involved in split agree-
ment antitrust cases, Gordon compiled eight explanations for splits
and distributor acquiescence: 1) Splits give superior play dates and
market coverage; 2) Splits allow advanced scheduling and exhibitors
do not object to blind bidding under splits; 3) Splits allow adjustments
on film rentals in contrast to bidding; 4) Through adjustments, splits
allow a sharing of risk not available under competitive bidding; 5) Dis-
tributors do not want to appear greedy; 6) Splits eliminate discrimina-
tion lawsuits by exhibitors who lose out in competitive bidding; 7)
Splits preserve exhibitors and thus avoid monopsony buying condi-
tions; and 8) Distributors fear suing exhibitors because of loss of
96. General Cinema, 532 F. Supp. at 1272.
97. Id. at 1272-73. The dismissal of point five may be too cavalier. One of the com-
mon reasons offered for the 1985 through 1986 wave of vertical mergers by distributors
into exhibition was to gain secure outlets and playtimes. See Will Tusher, Distribs Pursue
Circuit-Buyer with a Passion, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 5, 1987, at 1. See also De Vany &
Eckert, supra note 84, at 98-99.
98. General Cinema, 532 F. Supp. at 1272.
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goodwill and future business. 99 Whether these explanations refer to
splits by rotation or tracking is unclear. 100 But if the former, the fac-
tual and economic basis for many of the explanations, such as one,
two, five, seven, and eight, is doubtful.
Gordon, who championed the collusion theory of splits, offered
two additional explanations, building on points six and eight. First,
splitting is imposed by exhibitors on distributors as part of a monop-
sony cartel. 101 Distributors acquiesce because challenging split agree-
ments entails substantial costs beyond any benefits.10 2 To contest
splits distributors would have to either refuse to deal with exhibitors
or bring an antitrust action.10 3 Either approach would allegedly harm
distributors."° They would lower distributor goodwill and jeopardize
existing outlet networks since exhibitors' incentives to cooperate
would be lower. 10 5 According to Gordon, the antitrust approach to
halting splits would necessitate an enormous amount of litigation and
CoStS.
1 °6
Gordon's arguments are not convincing. Distributors' goodwill
with exhibitors was well established by prior business and litigious be-
havior. Distributors and exhibitors have long been suing one another
in hundreds of suits over such matters as blind bidding, under-report-
ing of receipts, and discrimination in licensing, so in many areas bene-
fits were expected to exceed costs.' 0 7
Gordon's view on antitrust costs is also doubtful. A few major
antitrust victories by distributors, entailing substantial treble damages,
would send a strong signal to exhibitors, dissuading them from collu-
sion. A modern day example is reflected in the Justice Department's
filing of cases against split agreements. Hundreds of suits would not
be necessary. But even if legal costs were an issue, because of the
incentive of distributors to get a free-ride on the litigation efforts of
rivals, for example, distributors could have avoided such costs (and
foregone the potential gains from court awarded damages) by bring-
ing their evidence of collusion to the Justice Department.
99. Gordon, supra note 3, at 241 n.5.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 240.
102. Id. at 240-41.
103. Id. at 241.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Gordon reports hundreds of private cases in the 1950s. l at 259 n.79. Conant
found 351 private cases from 1951 to 1957. CONANT, supra note 27, at 178-79.
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Second, under Paramount distributors were enjoined from dis-
criminating against exhibitors in any form; all exhibitors in theory
were to be offered a fair chance at licensing each movie released. 10 8
This ruling provided the basis for hundreds of lawsuits by aggrieved
exhibitors who felt themselves unfairly treated or who saw an oppor-
tunity to hold up distributors. Splitting reduced the incidence of ag-
grieved exhibitors since only one exhibitor in an area would be
designated to negotiate for a given film and exhibitors agreed not to
compete against one another for individual films. Thus, film splitting
could reduce the cost burden of discrimination suits. Interestingly,
competitive bidding was also used by some distributors to limit dis-
crimination lawsuits.'0 9
D. Economists' Theories
Economists have offered more sophisticated rationales for split
agreements. Kenney and Klein argue that film splitting in the form of
tracking was instituted by distributors following Paramount to main-
tain the pre-1948 quasi-franchise distribution system and all of its ben-
efits.1 ' While certainly an applicable argument for the 1950s, splitting
in the form of tracking in that era differs from splitting by film rota-
tion across exhibitors. Splitting by rotation is not designed to produce
the long-term quasi-franchise arrangements available through
tracking.
Kenney and Klein conjecture that split agreements by rotation
have persisted due to their ability to facilitate the optimal amount of
exhibitor inputs, such as clean theaters, high quality sound, and seat-
ing."' As noted, renegotiation or adjustments in rental payments by a
distributor, should a movie bomb at the box office, can take place
under split agreements. 1 2 Kenney and Klein posit that deviations in
exhibitor input services from optimal levels are better monitored and
adjusted under split agreements." 3
While the potential for adjustments on rental terms greatly facili-
tates distributors and exhibitors coming to mutually advantageous
terms and promotes long-term working relationships, how important
distributor input monitoring and adjustments are to maintaining opti-
mal inputs is unclear. Since all exhibitors depend on repeat consumer
108. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 344 U.S. 131 (1948).
109. 1953 Hearings, supra note 33, at 582 (statement of William Zimmerman).
110. Kenney & Klein, supra note 5, at 527-28.
111. Id. at 529-30.
112. Id.
113. Id.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:415
MOTION PICrURE DISTRIBUTION
sales, if they face competition or potential competition, they have a
strong incentive to provide optimal inputs, such as clean theaters,
fresh popcorn, high quality projection and sound systems, courteous
service, and so forth. Failure in these areas leads to lower consumer
sales since consumers can readily switch to other theaters, videocas-
settes, cable movie channels, or other forms of entertainment. There-
fore, the significance of Kenney and Klein's optimal input hypothesis
remains uncertain.
V
Film Distribution and Efficiencies
Prior to Paramount
A. Film Distribution
Distribution during the 1930s and 1940s was characterized by ex-
tensive vertical integration, franchising, bulk purchasing of movies,
buyer pooling agreements, and price discrimination. 114 During a two-
month or three-month buying season exhibitors would purchase (rent)
blocks of films, sight unseen, from various distributors for the follow-
ing year's showing. The films had yet to be produced. Theaters con-
tracted for different quantities of films depending on their film
turnover, with first-run houses contracting for far fewer films than
sub-sub-run houses. Theaters typically contracted with many distribu-
tors for their annual supply. Bulk purchasing through block booking
provided distributors with outlets, provided exhibitors with movies,
minimized inventory, and provided the basis for financing production.Films were released to theaters on a sequential basis, first-run,
second-run, and so on, with time clearances between first-runs and
second-runs of a few to over 100 days.115 Seventy-five percent of first-
run films had time clearances of more than twenty-eight days. 116 The-
aters were given geographic or zone clearances over rivals, with about
two-thirds of first-run theaters having clearances of ten miles or
more." 7 Distributors designated which theaters had first-run status,
and they generally reserved that status for their own theaters.1 8 Since
thirty to seventy percent of film rentals came from first-run showings,
a first-run theater designation was a highly valuable asset." 9 In addi-
114. For discussions of early film distribution, see generally CONANT, supra note 27; De
Vany & Eckert, supra note 84; Kenney & Klein, supra note 5.
115. CONANT, supra note 27, at 66.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 67.
118. Id. at 64.
119. See generally id. at 61-76.
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tion to length of run and time and zone clearances, licenses set mini-
mum admission prices.120 This system of clearances and resale price
maintenance was clearly designed to price discriminate.
B. Vertical Integration and Vertical Contractual Relationships
Prior to the post-war Paramount decisions, film distribution was
tightly controlled by the eight Paramount defendants. The five major
defendants-Paramount, Loew's, Twentieth Century-Fox, Warner,
and RKO-were integrated into production, distribution, and theater
ownership.121 These five firms controlled most first-run theaters in
both large and small cities through sole or joint ownership, leases, or
franchise agreements with independent theaters. 122 Ownership of the-
aters by the five majors, both individually and jointly, is shown below
in Table 1. Total theaters owned represented about twenty-four per-
cent of all theaters in the United States in 1945.123 Seventy percent of
first-run theaters in the nation's ninety-two largest markets (100,000
population and above), generating the bulk of rentals, were controlled
by the top five distributors. 24 These five firms also engaged in exten-
sive cross-licensing. 125 Each of the top five integrated firms rented
extensively from the other major distributors. 26 Approximately sev-
enty to eighty percent of rentals from the top five firms' theaters came
from the top five distributors. 27 The top eight distributors accounted
for ninety-five percent of film rental payments to distributors from
1935 to 1944.121 In addition to theater ownership and film cross-li-
censing, franchising or exclusive dealing contracts of one year or more
were common.129 Thus, long-term stable relationships through verti-
cal integration and exclusive dealing contracts characterized many dis-
tributor-exhibitor relationships during this era. Licensing and
distribution entailed block booking and a complex system of film re-
leases to capture the gains from price discrimination.
120. Id. at 58-61.
121. Id. at 43-57.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 48-50.
124. Id. at 50.
125. Id. at 61.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 62.
128. Id. at 44-46.
129. Schad v. TWentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 136 F.2d 991 (3d Cir. 1943); CONANT,
supra note 27, at 64; Kenney & Klein, supra note 5, at 521 n.64.
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Table 1
Theater Ownership by the Top Five Major
Distributors, 1945130
Joint Ownership
with Independent
Firm Theaters Owned Owners Total
Paramount 1,395 993 2,388
Twentieth
Century-Fox 636 66 1 702
Warner Bros. 501 20 521
Loew's 135 21 156
RKO 109 187 296
Joint Ownership
with Top Five
Firms 361 361.
Total 3,137 1,287 4,424
C. Benefits from the Distribution System
Numerous benefits accrued to distributors and exhibitors from
this arrangement. The elaborate system of runs, time and zone clear-
ances, and admission price control maximized total revenues through
price discrimination. Vertical integration and franchising established
long-term, stable buyer-seller relationships. This reduced the adminis-
trative cost of distribution by standardizing the process of exchange.
Long-term buyer-seller relationships lead to trust and cooperation,
which, because of the symbiotic relationship between distributor and
exhibitor, facilitate mutually- beneficial gains. Under such relation-
ships post-contract adjustments were expected to balance out in the
long-run, so that both sides could avoid litigation. For example, long-
term relationships should reduce cheating on license terms.
1. Reduced Cheating
Cheating on rentals was and continues to be a major problem in
film distribution. Distributors' monies come from box office receipts,
which are controlled by exhibitors, providing opportunities for exhibi-
tor fraud.' Exhibitors have a number of tactics available to increase
130. CONANT, supra note 27, at 49.
131. One estimate stated that 20% to 25% of theaters engaged in some form of cheat-
ing in 1947, costing distributors approximately $20 million. Id. at 71. For modern accounts
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their share of receipts at the expense of distributors. By delaying pay-
ment of distributors' shares, the exhibitor gains from the interest
earned on the monies. Among the fraudulent practices exhibitors
have engaged in are: submitting false invoices for local advertising or
failing to report rebates on newspaper advertising; showing a film at
an unauthorized location; screening a film for an extra, unauthorized
showing; recycling untorn tickets to the box office for resale; under-
reporting ticket sales from a roll of tickets; and illegally reproducing
movie prints.132 The extent of illegal print reproduction in the 1930s
and 1940s remains unknown. But in the age of videocassettes the in-
dustry estimated annual losses at $1 billion in the mid-1980s alone. 33
The incidence of exhibitor opportunism will vary with the organi-
zational form of distribution. Vertical integration into exhibition by
distributors reduces cheating on receipts since employee-managers,
who can be fired and are not residual claimants, cannot gain to the
same extent as owner-managers. Long-term franchise relationships
should also reduce exhibitor cheating since the gains from long-term
relationships, such as lower distribution costs and a secure, high qual-
ity supply, are lost if an exhibitor is caught cheating and is terminated.
In order to insure long-term relationships, distributors may provide an
income premium to franchised theaters. Cheating would jeopardize
such an income premium, further reducing the likelihood of fraud.'
Thus, the widespread ownership of theaters and use of franchising by
major distributors reduced the cost of distribution by reducing the ex-
tent of exhibitor cheating.
2. Gains from Block Booking
Another feature of distribution during this era was block book-
ing. Block booking was a major focus of the Justice Department's
antitrust suit against the movie industry in 1938.131 In 1940 the five
major distributors agreed in a consent decree to limit block booking to
of exhibitor cheating on receipts, see DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 7, 1985, at 4; DAILY VARIETY,
May 13, 1985, at 1; DAILY VARIETY, May 21, 1985, at 1. Specialized firms are hired to
audit receipts and minimize cheating.
132. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 127-28; Harold J. Salemson & Maurice Zolotow, It
Didn't Begin with Begelman: A Concise History of Film Business Finagling, ACTION, July-
Aug. 1978, at 40-49.
133. The Motion Picture Association of America spent $15 million annually during this
period to control piracy. David Pauly et. al., A Scourge of Video Pirates, NEWSWEEK, July
27, 1987, at 40-41.
134. Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Con-
tractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 615-41 (1981).
135. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 31-32.
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five films or less, which drastically limited its use.136 The objection to
block booking was that it extended monopoly power by forcing exhib-
itors to lease poor quality films in order to obtain high quality films.
This reasoning makes little sense since the full monopoly power of a
copyright holder can be extracted from high quality films without
resorting to overcharging on low quality films. Monopoly power of
the copyright holder can only be extracted once. Moreover, films
were booked in blocks long before production, so film quality at the
time of booking was unknown.
Block booking must provide some efficiencies. In general, block
booking reduces the transaction costs of distribution relative to film-
by-film distribution. As stated, films were sold blind well in advance
of actual production. This allowed producers to lower inventory costs
and finance future production. But the eventual success of a film is
indeterminate until its actual release. Theater owners have an incen-
tive to reject low quality films (discovered after initial showings) and
show only high quality, high demand films. Block booking prevented
this cream-skimming. Block booking contracts specified penalty dam-
ages of 1/nth of a block's total value for rejecting a film.' 37 Hence,
block booking insured the production of a wide selection of films by
preventing exhibitor free-riding on a producer's efforts.
Block booking was also a more economical way to sell films. Rel-
atively low value goods or complementary goods are often best sold in
bundles rather than item by item. For example, network produced
television programs are sold to affiliate stations in packages rather
than program-by-program. Distributing program-by-program or film-
by-film is decidedly more expensive. 38 The administrative cost differ-
ences alone are staggering. Under block booking, studios handled
about ten thousand contracts per year. Under picture-by-picture, the-
ater-by-theater contracting in the 1950s, they handled hundreds of
thousands of contracts per year. 139 After block booking was effec-
tively banned, exhibitors found film-by-film distribution far more ex-
pensive and returned to quasi-forms of block booking when given an
opportunity. 4 °
136. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1940-3 Trade Cas. (CCH) 56,072
(S.D.N.Y. 1940).
137. Kenney & Klein, supra note 5, at 522-24.
138. De Vany & Eckert, supra note 84, at 81-83.
139. Motion Pictures Distribution Practices, 1956: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
Select Comm. on Small Business, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1956) (statement of Charles L.
Feldman, Vice President, Universal Pictures) [hereinafter 1956 Hearings].
140. Conant reports that in 1950, 3,700 theaters booked Paramount films in groups with
a right to cancel 20% of those booked. CONANT, supra note 27, at 145 n.136. Another
study reports that when block booking was limited to no more than five films, under the
19951 MOTION PICrI-tRE DISTRIBUTION
436 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 17:415
Block booking also reduced risk and, coupled with adjustments,
provided a more efficient form of risk sharing between distributors
and exhibitors. Owing to the varying quality of films, blocks of films
yield portfolio gains since revenue streams are not perfectly corre-
lated. This reduces the variance of revenues and thus risk. Risk re-
duction is especially important for asset holders who are non-
diversified, which likely was the case for many theater owners. Since
a film's value is unknown, a priori, further mutually beneficial gains
were provided by ex-post adjustments in contract terms. In the case
of poor movies, distributors could compensate exhibitors by direct
payment or adjustments in rental terms. Exhibitors could compensate
distributors for high quality films by providing better play dates for
subsequent films or absorbing a higher share of advertising expendi-
tures. Theater ownership by distributors or franchise agreements with
independent theaters formalized risk sharing through block booking
and adjustments.
Hence, the complex, tightly controlled movie distribution system
prior to Paramount provided distinctly lower costs of distribution.
Vertical integration and franchising reduced cheating, administrative
costs, and risk. Block booking lowered distribution costs per film, re-
duced cream-skimming, and reduced risk.
VI
Post-Paramount Distribution
The Paramount decrees tore apart this complex system of film
distribution.141 The five major distributors were forced to divest
themselves of theater ownership. All distributors were prohibited
from franchising with affiliated or independent theaters. Banned as
well were block booking, control of admission prices, and any form of
discrimination in licensing movies, such as on runs, clearances, and
rental shares. Distributors were barred from favoring former affili-
ated theaters or particular exhibitors. The prohibitions were clearly
intended to protect independent first-run theaters by providing them
1940 consent decree, the cost to distributors rose sharply, forcing many independents out
of business. Ernest Borneman, United States Versus Hollywood: The Case Study of an
Antitrust Suit, in THE AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 449-62 (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985).
141. The decrees were signed by a statutory three-judge panel and are as follows:
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,863 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (the RKO decree); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948-49 Trade Cas.
63,009 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (the Paramount decree); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1950-51
Trade Cas. 64,544 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the Twentieth Century-Fox decree); United States v.
Loew's, Inc., 1950-51 Trade Cas. 67,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (the Warner Bros. decree);
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 1952-53 Trade Cas. 67,324 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (the Loew's
decree).
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with equal access to all new movies. Paramount was like a grand
Robinson-Patman Act for theaters: All forms of discrimination across
like theaters were to end.
Lost in the process of these sweeping changes were the efficiency
gains from vertical integration, long-term franchising, and block book-
ing. Whatever the anticompetitive effects of these policies as decided
under Paramount, they had clearly served to reduce distribution costs.
The banned policies evolved over many years of competitive pressures
for efficient distribution.142 Such efficiencies are not forsaken easily.
Distributors and exhibitors would naturally seek close legal substi-
tutes for the forbidden practices. 43
A. Efficiencies from Tracking and Splitting
TWo forms of licensing dominated movie allocation following Par-
amount: tracking and splitting by rotation. It is noteworthy that when
distributors and exhibitors were free to choose alternative forms of
film allocation in the 1950s, competitive bidding, the method initially
mandated by the court, was used for only a tiny fraction of films.
1
"4
Voluntary tracking represents a substitute for two practices
banned by Paramount: vertical integration and exclusive dealing
through franchising. Tracking provides the efficiencies of long-term
distribution relationships achieved through repetitive buying and sell-
ing, standardization of distribution, and subsequent settling-up.
Tracking allows adjustments after a movie's revenues are known, facil-
itating long-run survival of competitive theaters and reducing the like-
lihood and extent of exhibitor fraud on distributors' rental shares.
Tracking avoids the costlier, more complex, and higher risk means of
allocating films by competitive bidding. Bid preparation and evalua-
tion is time consuming and costly, and bids are difficult to compare
across exhibitors because consumer demand is jointly dependent upon
run length and geographic clearance. 45 Relative to tracking, bidding
142. Robert Anderson, The Motion Picture Patents Company: A Reevaluation, in THE
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY 132-52. (Tino Balio ed., rev. ed. 1985).
143. Examples in other areas abound. For instance, the per se illegality of resale price
maintenance has led to de facto forms of resale price maintenance, so that its efficiencies
are maintained. Dealers are influenced in indirect ways to maintain prices, which in turn
influences manufacturers to police rival dealers' pricing policies to prevent free riding.
Similar skirting of the law to maintain distribution efficiencies occurred when exclusive
territories were made per se illegal. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
144. A 1955 survey by Loew's found that for an average picture with 15,000 bookings,
competitive bidding was used in only 3.2% of situations. Universal Pictures had a similarly
low incidence of competitive bidding. 1956 Hearings, supra note 139, at 372, 474.
145. De Vany & Eckert, supra note 84, at 89.
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increases exhibitors' uncertainty over films to be shown and rental
terms. The extent of tracking following the Paramount decision is un-
known, but based on accounts of licensing practices in numerous anti-
trust cases it appears to have been a common practice. 46 Hence,
although integration through ownership or franchising was disallowed
under Paramount, de facto integration through tracking provided a
substitute means of gaining comparable efficiencies by noncontractual
exclusive dealing arrangements.
Splitting by rotation offered similar distribution cost advantages
over competitive bidding, but without the long-term stable buyer-
seller efficiency gains of tracking. Splitting avoided the costly process
of bidding and attendant exhibitor uncertainty over film acquisitions
and unremunerative rental terms. Splitting allowed adjustments, with
its risk sharing between distributor and exhibitor and, of primary im-
portance, reduced exhibitor incentive to commit fraud. 47 And, as
noted earlier, splitting guards against discrimination lawsuits since
each member of the split is given an equal opportunity to obtain good
movies, with possibly a better chance of receiving a box office hit than
under competitive bidding.
Splitting by rotation also offers a weak form of block booking.
Implicit in distributors' participation in splitting is that some theater
will screen their movies, reducing the risk of production. In like fash-
ion to block booking, splitting reduces the cream-skimming tendency
of exhibitors since films are assigned to exhibitors on a rotating basis.
Splitting is no less binding on exhibitors than block booking since pen-
alty clauses can be activated if a theater does not fulfill its contracted
run.
1 48
Decreases in distribution costs and flexibility in scheduling
through adjustments increase output and are procompetitive. Lower
distribution costs help keep down admission and concession prices,
increasing consumer demand and consumer welfare. As noted, flexi-
bility in scheduling through adjustments allows shorter runs for low
grossing movies, freeing screens for potentially higher demand mov-
146. Wilder Enters. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980); Ad-
miral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978), modifying 437 F.
Supp. 1268 (D. Neb. 1977); Viking Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 320
F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1965).
147. Adjustments were commonplace after Paramount, with, in some cases, actual guar-
antees of exhibitor profits. CONANT, supra note 27, at 135. For example, cash adjustments
to exhibitors from Loew's in 1955 were $2 million, representing 3.5% of total Loew's dis-
tributor income. 1956 Hearings, supra note 139, at 363-64 (statement of Charles M.
Reagan).
148. Admiral Theatre Corp., 437 F. Supp. at 1278.
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ies. This increases consumer welfare by increasing both the number
and variety of movies shown.
To summarize, licensing by tracking or splitting offered distinct
advantages over competitive bidding and served to preserve some of
the efficiencies lost due to the absence of vertical integration, exclu-
sive dealing, and block booking following Paramount. Competitive
bidding offered none of the efficiencies lost under Paramount, plus it
entailed some clear cost disadvantages, such as a costly bidding pro-
cess, greater exhibitor uncertainty, lack of risk sharing, and an in-
creased incentive for exhibitor fraud. It is not surprising that the
incidence of competitive bidding following Paramount was extremely
low.
B. Empirical Evidence
This analysis implies that distribution costs should have risen af-
ter 1948 owing to less efficient forms of movie licensing. No detailed
firm data on distribution costs are available, but some indirect evi-
dence suggests that costs rose appreciably after 1948.149 With an in-
crease in distribution costs, distributors would attempt to raise their
share of box office receipts in order to maintain prior profit margins.
Estimates of distributors' rental shares for this era differ across stud-
ies, but all indicate a rise after the Paramount decision. 5 ' Distribu-
tors estimated their average rental share rose from 26% in 1947 to
35% in 1953. According to exhibitors, distributors' average share rose
from 32.6% in 1947 to 35.9% in 1955.1'5 Using distributor receipts
estimated by Crandall, distributors' shares rose from 30.4% in 1948 to
39.5% in 1954.152
Whether the rise in distributors' rental shares was due solely to
distribution cost increases is not clear. The industry was in great tur-
moil during this era due to the rise of television and reductions in total
attendance. 153 Moreover, vertically integrated distributors' rental
shares prior to divestiture may have been understated to hide profits
in theatrical divisions in order to avoid payouts under profit participa-
tion contracts. With divestiture, profits could be hidden less easily.
149. Crandall, supra note 80, at 68-70.
150. Id. at 65.
151. 1956 Hearings, supra note 139, at 305.
152. Crandall, supra note 80, at 59-60. By way of comparison with the 1970s and early
1980s, average distributor shares ranged from a high of 45.3% in 1980 to a low of 34.3% in
1984. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 44. For top grossing movies, shares are higher. Star Wars
gained 59.3% of total domestic gross. See Peter S. Myers, The Studio as Distributor, in THE
MOVIE BUSINESS BOOK 275, 279 (Jason E. Squire & Englewood Cliffs eds., 1983).
153. Crandall, supra note 80, at 68-70.
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Distributor rental shares could also have risen if the supply of movies
fell, as exhibitors competed for a smaller supply.154 -Releases over this
period for the top nine distributors first rose from 249 in 1947 to 320
in- 1951 then fell to 301 in 1953 and 215 in 1955.'" Hence, the initial
increase in supply should have lowered distributor shares but no such
effect was evident. The decline in supply after 1951 could have raised
shares, but the demand for movies also fell. Paid admissions fell from
3.352 billion in 1948 to 1.956 billion in 1954.156 Thus, the rapid distrib-
utor share rise after 1948 does not appear to be due to a reduction in
film supply.
Also consistent with a rise in distribution costs would be a rise in
admission prices, as exhibitors attempted to recoup higher film licens-
ing costs. Of course, demand conditions had to allow any price rises.
Average admission price in real terms rose sharply, from forty-six
cents in 1948 to sixty-one cents in 1950, a thirty-three percent rise, and
remained near sixty cents throughout the 1950s.157 Hence, the evi-
dence, although indirect, is consistent with a shift to less efficient and
thus costlier methods of film licensing after Paramount.
In summary, the Paramount decision cost distributors many of
the most efficient distribution practices of the prior period-vertical
integration, exclusive dealing, and block booking. Tracking and split-
ting, which dominated licensing practices in the 1950s, were attempts
to substitute for the distribution efficiencies lost under Paramount.
The rise in distributor rental shares and admission prices after 1948 is
consistent with this loss in distribution efficiency.
VII
Splitting and the Rule of Reason
The above analysis indicates that a rule of reason approach is
more consistent with splitting's actual impact. However, recent deci-
154. Rental shares appear to fluctuate inversely to the number of movie releases. Vo-
gel found a simple correlation between shares and number of film releases of -.4 for the
period 1965 to 1983, which is significant at the .05 level. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 83.
155. FILM BOOK DAILY YEARBOOK 100 (1959); FILM BOOK DAILY YEARBOOK 69
(1949).
156. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF BUSINESS, SELECTED SERVICE
TRADES-SUMMARY STATISTICS, (1948 & 1954).
157. Average nominal admission adjusted for the entertainment tax was deflated by the
CPI to obtain real prices. See VOGEL, supra note 70, at 362-63, 369. The ban on retail
price setting by distributors under Paramount may also have contributed to the price rise.
However, distributors continued to use resale price maintenance after Paramount by
awarding licenses to theaters who adopted their suggested admission price. The Justice
Department approved, this method of licensing. 1956 Hearings, supra note 139, at 738.
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sions have completely dismissed efficiency rationales for splitting.
This approach deserves reexamination.
The standards set forth in General Cinema and Capitol Service
indicate that for defendants to prevail under a rule of reason thedy
must demonstrate that distributor rental shares are no different be-
tween split and non-split cities, holding constant all relevant factors
that influence rental shares, and that splitting provides competitive
gains beyond mere financial advantages to exhibitors and distributors.
Splitting must result in demonstrable improvements in competition.
Presumably, equal distributor rental shares between split and non-
split cities implies no loss in consumer welfare under splitting.
A. Rental Share Equality
These are difficult standards to meet and, in the case of rental
share equality, set out an incorrect standard. In the absence of com-
petitive bidding, distributors' rental shares should fall. However, dis-
tribution costs will also be lower under splitting, compensating for
foregone bidding revenues. Unfortunately, quantifying cost savings
has proven difficult for defendants. Nevertheless, distribution costs
are reduced by eliminating the costs of competitive bidding, reducing
fraud, reducing litigation expenses, and insuring outlet availability.
Where splitting is accepted by distributors, cost savings must compen-
sate for foregone revenues, since distributors can end splitting when-
ever its relative profitability becomes unfavorable. Only if
distributors' risk-adjusted profit rates, not gross rental share, were
lower under splitting could a case be made that splitting was poten-
tially anticompetitive.
Some idea of the magnitude of rental share differences can be
gained from past studies. Twentieth Century-Fox found in a compari-
son of split agreement and competitive bidding cities that its rental
income was five percent lower in split cities.'58 In a similar vein, after
guarantees to distributors were banned in Pennsylvania, which drasti-
cally reduced competitive bidding, rental shares to distributors fell by
four percent. 159 A four or five percent rental differential between
split agreement and competitive bidding cities seems rather modest in
terms of alleged exhibitor monopsony power.
If these figures are accurate, they help explain the long accept-
ance of splits by distributors. Competitive bidding at various times
could easily have entailed five percent higher costs of distribution due,
for example, to greater exhibitor fraud, litigation costs, and adminis-
158. Myers, supra note 152, at 282.
159. Associated Film Distrib. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1113 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
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trative costs. Thus, the courts' standard of zero rental share differ-
ences between split and non-split cities would likely lead to incorrect
decisions under a rule of reason approach.
B. Changes in Efficiency Across Licensing Methods
Although the efficiency advantages to splitting in general during
certain eras is evident, these advantages are not immutable. The small
differences in distributor rental shares between split agreement and
competitive bidding cities is consistent with frequent shifts between
distribution methods as relative costs change. In the 1950s splitting
and tracking dominated distribution. In the 1970s competitive bidding
dominated distribution." The relative costs and benefits of alterna-
tive forms of distribution change over time with, for example, the sup-
ply and demand for movies, changes in the technology of distribution
and monitoring exhibitors, and new legal results in exhibitor-distribu-
tor disputes. As relative costs and benefits change, distributors will
shift from splitting to tracking to bidding and back again.161 And at
any given time, regardless of existing distribution arrangements, a
unique movie can be licensed by competitive bidding.
One crucial factor in determining the profitability of alternative
distribution methods is the supply and demand for movies. As the
supply of films tightens, competitive bidding becomes more attractive
to distributors. The average supply of new films by national distribu-
tors declined in general from the 1940s to the 1980s, decade-by-dec-
ade. The average annual supply of film releases were: 420 in the
forties; 338 in the fifties; 230 in the sixties; 246 in the seventies; and
207 from 1980-1984.162 During one particularly sharp decline, new
film releases fell from 282 in 1971 to 167 in 1977 and then rose to 232
by 1983. Concurrently, the number of screens in the United States
rose from 12,825 in 1965 to 20,200 in 1984, or by fifty-eight percent.
During the period of 1971 through 1977 screens increased nineteen
percent while new releases fell by thirty-nine percent.163 It is no won-
der that competitive bidding dominated distribution in the 1970s.
160. According to General Cinema and Buena Vista, between one-half and two-thirds
of all distribution was by competitive bidding prior to April 1977. General Cinema v.
Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1271 (E.D. Cal. 1982).
161. Jim Robbins, Distributors, Exhib 'Marriages' Increase as Bidding Dries Up, DAILY
VARIETY, July 19, 1985, at 3. Charles M. Reagan, Vice-President of Loew's, testifying in
1956, stated, "we have indicated a willingness to eliminate competitive bidding whenever
possible in situations where returns from the theaters are comparable by licensing our pic-
ture on a split basis." 1956 Hearings, supra note 139, at 373.
162. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 45; Guback, supra note 80, at 215.
163. VOGEL, supra note 70, at 45; Guback, supra note 80, at 215.
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C. Competitive Effects
Before discussing potential competitive improvements in distri-
bution and the movie industry due to splitting, the nature of that com-
petition must be outlined. At issue in splitting cases is the wholesale
market for movies. The general view is that improved competition in
wholesale markets-lower costs, lower prices, greater output, better
service, and so forth-redounds to the benefit of retail consumers, as-
suming competition at the retail level.
The main form of competition for first-run movies at the retail
level is product differentiation across movies. Admission price is
roughly the same across first-run theaters in a geographic market.
Consumers choose movies more on word-of-mouth advertising, crit-
ics' reviews, and performers than admission price. Price competition
exists between first-run and second-run movies, between movies and
videocassettes, and between movie-going and other forms of en-
tertainment. However, once a decision is made to attend a first-run
movie, then product differentiation, exhibitor location, and theater
characteristics determine movie choice. Competition takes the form
of the number, variety, and quality of movies, along with the quality of
exhibition. Improvements in these dimensions reflect increased
competition.
Competition at the wholesale level in the licensing of films takes
place on price or license terms, the number of movies, movie quality,
and the costs of distribution. The lower the cost of distribution, the
less pressure to raise admission and concession prices in competition
with alternative forms of movie-watching and other leisure-time activ-
ities. Improvements in the number and quality of movies parallel
product competition at the retail level.
In contrast to these dimensions of competition, the debate on
splitting agreements has focused largely on license terms. The debate
has centered almost exclusively on how box office revenues are di-
vided between distributors and exhibitors, with the difference being
used as a test of exhibitor collusive monopsony power.
The emphasis on revenue division as the crux of the problem is
overly narrow, missing the many other dimensions of competition at
the wholesale and retail levels. How rents are divided up between
buyers and sellers presents no antitrust welfare issue unless output is
restricted. The effect of splitting agreements on retail competition
and output has not been addressed in any antitrust case. As shown
above, splitting can improve competition relative to competitive bid-
ding by reducing distribution costs and increasing movie variety and
the number of movies screened.
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In the long-run, both distributors and exhibitors must earn com-
petitive rates of return to remain in business. Pure monopsonistic
pricing by exhibitors would drive distributors from the market. There
is no evidence that distributors have been driven from the market by
exhibitor collusion. On a national basis, the number of major distribu-
tors has remained relatively constant at six to ten distributors since the
1930s, with many minor distributors moving in and out of the market
over time.164
In summary, splitting affects far more than just how box office
receipts are divided up between exhibitors and distributors. It affects
key dimensions of competition: the costs of distribution; admission
and concession price; and the number and variety of movies in compe-
tition. The leading cases have ignored these competition-improving
gains from splitting. This has inevitably led to a per se treatment of
splitting.
VIII
Conclusion
Various motion picture exhibitors have been fighting against dis-
tribution practices for decades, including block booking, blind bid-
ding, time and zone clearances, resale price maintenance, and
competitive bidding. For much of that time the Justice Department
has been their ally. Having achieved major victories against certain
practices, such as block booking and blind bidding, it is ironic to find
the Justice Department imposing heavy fines on exhibitors for a prac-
tice that it condoned for thirty years. It is additionally ironic since
distributors, those most likely harmed by anticompetitive uses of split-
ting, actively participated in split agreements for years.
There is clearly much more to split agreements than an alleged
naked price fixing agreement. Efficiency gains can explain the use of
splitting in many cases. As a system widely used by both distributors
and exhibitors, in competition with other forms of distribution for
over thirty years, it provided mutually beneficial gains. Without such
gains it would have long since disappeared. Splitting generates cost
savings in distribution over competitive bidding and can enhance com-
petition by increasing the number and variety of movies screened.
Splitting should be judged under a rule of reason, with the procompe-
titive efficiencies of splitting weighed against its potential anticompeti-
tive losses.
164. CONANT, supra note 27, at 107-53; Guback, supra note 80, at 218-25.
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